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THE AFTERLIFE OF DEAD METAPHORS:
ON DERRIDA’S PRAGMATISM
Anthony REYNOLDS1
One does not know what it means yet, one 
will have to start again, to return, to go on.
Derrida
A Taste for the Secret
ABSTRACT ▪ : This essay analyzes the role of  the “dead metaphor” within 
deconstruction and neopragmatism in an attempt to elucidate some of  the 
surreptitious affi  nities between the two discursive formations that would 
constitute what Derrida has called a “pragrammatology (to come).” On the 
basis of  a thorough metaphorological rereading of  philosophical thought that 
extends from Vico, Nietzsche, and Heidegger to Blumenberg, Derrida and 
Rorty, this essay argues that deconstruction continues to generate new contexts 
of  meaning and reference in the form of  a pragmatism that has long been 
integral to its discursive identity.
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At a symposium on “Deconstruction and Pragmatism” organized by Chantal 
Mouff e at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris in 1993, Richard Rorty 
sought to rescue Derrida from what he called the “ﬂ urry of  deconstructive activity” 
that had dominated the academy in the 1970s and 1980s. “I see no real connection,” 
Rorty (1996b, p.15) confessed, 
[…] between what Derrida is up to and the activity which is called 
‘deconstruction,’ and I wish that the latter word had never taken hold as a 
description of  Derrida’s work. I have never found, or been able to invent, a 
satisfactory deﬁ nition of  that word. I often use it as a shorthand for ‘the sort 
of  thing Derrida does,’ but I do so faute de mieux, and with a self-exculpatory 
shrug.
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In his response to Rorty’s comments on the use and meaning of  the word 
deconstruction, Derrida poses several questions that, unprepossessing though they 
appear, go a long way in fact toward elucidating some of  the affi  nities between 
pragmatism and deconstruction:
I have often said I do not need to use this word and I often wondered why it 
should have interested so many people. However, as time passes, and when I 
see so many people trying to get rid of  this word, I ask myself  whether there 
is not perhaps something in it. I would ask you how you would explain why 
this word, which, for essential reasons, and I agree with Rorty, is meaningless 
and without reference, could impose itself ? How is it that something ‘x,’ 
which does not have a stable meaning or reference, becomes indispensable 
in a certain ﬁ nite, but open, context, during a certain period of  time, for a 
certain number of  actors?” (DERRIDA, 1996, p.85).
Ostensibly agreeing with Rorty that the word deconstruction is unnecessary 
and essentially without meaning or reference, Derrida asks his interlocutors to 
consider how such an invented word could nevertheless manage to gain currency 
within a speciﬁ c linguistic community and thus become not only meaningful but 
indispensable to that community. While Derrida’s questions resonate through the 
remainder of  his discussion, they remain pointedly unanswered. Or do they? I would 
like to suggest that the curiosity evinced in Derrida’s questions is disingenuous and 
that the questions themselves are in fact rhetorical, since the process by which an 
essentially meaningless new word like deconstruction develops a set of  references 
and a stable meaning over time and thus becomes indispensable for the members of  
a given community – far from calling out for further inquiry, as Derrida’s questions 
seem to imply – in fact constitutes the very method of  pragmatism as Rorty himself  
has described and deﬁ ned it on numerous occasions over the course of  his career. 
According to Rorty, the pragmatist introduces unfamiliar marks, noises and 
vocabularies into circulation at critical moments when “[...] things are not going 
well, when a new generation is dissatisﬁ ed, when the young have come to look 
at what is being done in a given genre as hackwork” (RORTY, 1991a, p.88). The 
pragmatist then allows these new ﬁ gures or “metaphors,” which have no “ﬁ xed 
place in a language game” and thus no stable meaning or reference (RORTY, 1989, 
p.18-19), to become “literalized into the language” and to attain the status of  “dead 
metaphors,” which become valuable as “tools of  social progress” (RORTY, 1991c, 
p.17-18). Derrida’s rhetorical questions suggest that the word deconstruction gains 
meaning and reference according to the very logic that Rorty reserves for the 
contingent vocabularies of  his own neopragmatism, and that deconstruction itself  
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gains a pragmatic legitimacy that Rorty reserves for the literalized or dead metaphors 
that constitute such vocabularies. 
To be sure, this ironic observation leaves Rorty appearing incapable of  
recognizing his own method operating in the context of  the subject under 
discussion – incapable, in other words, of  seeing in deconstruction an exemplary 
instance of  the successful elaboration of  his own method, despite having already 
described and even praised Derrida’s work in precisely these terms2. But there is a 
deeper point to this anecdote beyond its irony. By graciously, though surreptitiously, 
extending to Rorty the possibility that deconstruction may be interpreted as one of  
pragmatism’s own dead metaphors, Derrida reconﬁ rms his sense of  the affi  nities 
between these two discursive formations as he has done repeatedly over the course 
of  his career, suggesting the manner in which deconstruction may live on after its 
own death, continuing to impose itself  by generating new meaning and reference in 
the form of  a pragmatism that has long been integral to its discursive identity.
From the early interest in the semiotics of  Charles Peirce that Derrida (1976) 
demonstrates in Of Grammatology, pragmatism has always been implicated within 
the project of  deconstruction, Peirce’s semiotic work providing Derrida with a 
theoretical perspective from which to contest Saussure’s thesis of  the “arbitrariness 
of  the sign” and to replace it with a more dynamic model of  semiotic immotivation 
“as an active movement” that anticipates the Derridean notion of  the trace. Yet it 
is only many years after Of  Grammatology is published that Derrida begins to broach 
the possible methodological affi  liation between deconstruction and pragmatism in 
more explicit terms. In his 1983 “My Chances/Mes chances,” for instance, Derrida 
proposes what he tellingly refers to as a “pragrammatology,” a method of  analysis 
“at the intersection of  a pragmatics and a grammatology” that would “[…] take 
into account the situation of  the marks, in particular of  the utterances, the place of  
senders and addressees, the framing, the sociohistorical outline [découpage], and so 
forth” (DERRIDA, 2007a, p.373). Derrida returns to this topic brieﬂ y in 1988 in a 
footnote to the “Afterword” to Limited Inc, where he reaffi  rms his sense that 
Grammatology has always been a sort of  pragmatics, but the discipline 
that bears this name today involves too many presuppositions requiring 
deconstruction […] to be simply homogeneous with that which is announced 
in De la grammatologie. A pragrammatology (to come) would articulate in a 
more fruitful and more rigorous manner these two discourses” (DERRIDA, 
1988, p.159).
2 See, for instance, Rorty (1982).
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And in the context of  the 1993 symposium on deconstruction and pragmatism 
mentioned above, Derrida reiterates his sense of  affi  nity between the two discourses, 
suggesting that “[...] from the beginning the question concerning the trace was 
connected with a certain notion of  labour, of  doing, and […] what I called then 
pragrammatology tried to link grammatology and pragmatism” (DERRIDA, 1996, 
p.78).
Ultimately, however, Derrida distances himself  from Rorty’s “pragmatization” 
of  deconstruction, remaining in the end unwilling to completely abandon his 
commitment to the older idealist paradigm of  philosophy and embrace the textualist 
paradigm of  pragmatism with the exclusivity demanded by Rorty3. Rather than 
simply replacing philosophy with literature as Rorty would have it, Derridean 
deconstruction remains irreducibly committed to both philosophy and literature, 
staking out a strategic position for itself  between philosophy and literature, idealism 
and textualism, necessity and chance, “absolutely refus[ing],” as Derrida (1996, 
p.81) expressly states, “[…] a discourse that would assign me a single code, a single 
language game, a single context, a single situation.” From the perspective of  the later 
Derrida, Rorty’s own sense of  deconstruction as predicated upon an abandonment 
of  philosophy for literature represents an example of  
[…]‘repressive tolerance’ which consists in accepting one’s doing literature, 
provided that one has no relation with philosophy, with truth, or even, in the 
extreme, with public space. Someone like Rorty is perfectly happy that we 
should give ourselves over to literature – on the understanding that it is a private 
matter, a private language, and that taking shelter in a private language is just 
ﬁ ne. I have tried to emphasize that deconstruction has nothing whatsoever to 
do with privatizing philosophy, letting it take shelter in literature; the gesture, 
the division, is completely diff erent. (DERRIDA; FERRARIS, 2001, p.9-10). 
Thus, the project of  pragrammatology is never seriously undertaken. Unlike 
deconstruction it has never imposed itself, nor become indispensable for a given 
community. And unlike deconstruction it has never been “literalized into the 
language” as a dead metaphor. 
This fundamental impasse between Derrida and Rorty on the relationship 
between philosophy and literature is recapitulated in their more pointed disagreement 
on the subject of  metaphor, which has long played crucial though distinct roles 
within their respective projects. While Rorty’s neopragmatism relies on a literary 
model of  metaphor as a means by which to escape the philosophical tradition, 
Derridean deconstruction insists on a determination of  metaphor that traverses the 
3 See, for instance, Lorenzo Fabbri (2007).
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disciplines of  both philosophy and literature. Though this debate on metaphor has 
played out historically within the context of  contemporary poststructuralism, it may 
be said to begin with the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Vico, to whom it 
is necessary to return in order to better understand the terms, the provenance, and 
certainly the stakes of  the debate. In The New Science, Vico establishes a theory of  
the role of  sapienza poetica or poetic wisdom in the formation of  our traditions and 
institutions of  knowledge. In direct opposition to the prevailing rationalism of  his 
day, Vico (1948, p.120) underscores the limitations of  human reason and attributes 
to man a constitutive “ignorance” or “deﬁ ciency of  human reason.” Predicated 
upon this axiomatic view of  human ignorance, Vico develops his theory of  poetic 
or metaphorical language as a pragmatic means of  coming to terms with all that 
exceeds the limited grasp of  the human intellect. To compensate for this ignorance 
early man was compelled to develop his “corporeal imagination” in order to project 
familiar meanings onto unfamiliar natural phenomena within his environment: “It is 
noteworthy,” Vico (1948, p.129-130) observes, “[…] that in all languages the greater 
part of  the expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from 
the human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions.” According 
to his “axiom that man in his ignorance makes himself  the rule of  the universe,” 
Vico views such early metaphors as constituting the pragmatic foundations upon 
which the institutions of  myth, religion and philosophy would later emerge.
This view of  early man as an artist or poet is renewed in the nineteenth 
century by Nietzsche (2001, p.881) among others for whom the “drive to form 
metaphors” constitutes what he calls a “fundamental human drive.” Indeed, as 
Sarah Kofman (1993) observes in Nietzsche and Metaphor, Nietzsche’s interest in 
metaphor as a pragmatic tool of  human self-assertion can be seen to span his entire 
philosophical career. What Nietzsche consistently foregrounds in his work, however, 
is the paradoxical fact that the impulse to use metaphor as a tool of  self-assertion 
is repeatedly forgotten and its eff ects repeatedly literalized into the very fabric of  
our cultural formations4. To be sure, Nietzsche’s interest in metaphor appears to 
culminate in “On Truth and Falsity in Their Extramoral Sense” (1873), in which he 
famously describes truth as a 
[…] mobile army of  metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a 
sum of  human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensiﬁ ed, 
metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage seems [...] ﬁ xed, canonic, and 
binding; truths are illusions which one has forgotten are illusions; worn-out 
metaphors which have become powerless to aff ect the senses; coins which 
4 See, for instance, Kofman (1993, p.23-59).
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have their obverse eff aced and now are no longer of  account as coins but 
merely as metal.” (NIETZSCHE, 1992, p.636). 
Yet Nietzsche’s Viconian view of  man as a “metaphorical animal” is also 
indispensable to his later critique of  Western morality in On the Genealogy of  Morals 
(1887), in which he interprets the emergence of  the moral realm itself  as a residuum 
of  forgotten metaphors.
During the twentieth century, an increasing number of  philosophers have 
developed their own particular versions of  this pragmatic theory of  metaphor. 
Predicated upon a Viconian model of  the rhetorical foundations of  human culture 
and its institutions, Hans Blumenberg launches his project of  metaphorology in 
1960 which seeks to identify residual metaphors within philosophical discourse. 
And like Vico, Blumenberg (1997, p.95) attributes the anthropological signiﬁ cance 
of  rhetoric to the same “principle of  insuffi  cient reason” which motivates its use 
in Vico’s theory. Yet where Vico relegates the pragmatic use of  poetry to an early 
epoch in human history, Blumenberg insists that rhetoric is operative throughout 
the entirety of  history, that rhetoric is not overcome or abandoned in the course 
of  history. Indeed, Blumenberg (1998, p.11) criticizes Vico for, as he puts it, falling 
back into a teleological or “Cartesian scheme insofar as he reserves an early historical 
epoch for the language of  fantasy.” 
Instead, Blumenberg calls for a more radical reappraisal of  the relationship 
between “mythos and logos,” suggesting that the former remains the irreducible 
foundation of  the latter. Thus, rather than residual traces of  a more primitive 
language which gradually yield in the ricorso to the more rational and objective idiom 
of  philosophical logic, poetic metaphors represent a “[…] fundamental part of  
philosophical discourse, ‘translations’ that cannot be recuperated into the realm of  logic 
or authenticity” (BLUMENBERG, 1998, p.10). Blumenberg calls such metaphors, by 
which he means the whole Vichian ﬁ eld of  tropes, “absolute metaphors” since they 
serve as the conditioning foundation of  philosophy on the one hand and yet remain 
philosophically irreducible on the other hand – cut off  or separated from its thematic 
content. Indeed, it is precisely their disappearance within the discursive institutions 
they found – their “literalization into the language” as it were – that makes such 
metaphors pragmatically functional as a kind of  forgotten epistemic infrastructure 
or underground (Substruktur des Denkens) within such institutions (BLUMENBERG, 
1998, p.13). What motivates Blumenberg’s metaphorological work is the metaphysical 
challenge presented by Heidegger’s history of  Being, Seinsgeschichte, whose epoché 
(corresponding to Vico’s ricorso), Seinsvergessenheit, Blumenberg translates into the 
rhetorical terms of  his metaphorology. Thus, Blumenberg reformulates what 
Heidegger refers to as the “ontological diff erence” between Being and being into 
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the rhetorical terms of  a metaphorological diff erence between absolute metaphors 
and their manifest rhetorical eff ects. Rather than Being, in other words, it is precisely 
metaphor which is forgotten and thus calls out for recovery. In this way, the project 
of  metaphorology displaces Heidegger’s “Aufriss” of  history and reduces it to the 
pragmatism of  a meta-rhetoric of  deconstruction, anticipating both Derrida’s and 
Rorty’s interest in the role of  metaphor in Heideggerian philosophy5.
Following in the footsteps of  Vico, Nietzsche and Blumenberg whose 
rhetorically informed critiques of  Western metaphysics have sought to expose the 
metaphorological foundations of  this tradition, Derrida’s own deconstruction of  
metaphysics has also been motivated by a desire to expose the rhetorical foundations 
of  the philosophical tradition. Although largely unfamiliar with Blumenberg’s 
metaphorological project, Derrida’s reading of  metaphor in the text of  Aristotle’s 
metaphysics – a crucial reference point for Heideggerian philosophy – in “White 
Mythology” reiterates and conﬁ rms Blumenberg’s central insights regarding the 
latent centrality of  metaphor within the language of  philosophy, though it is quite 
clear that Derrida remains unconvinced that all such latent metaphors can be 
successfully identiﬁ ed, elucidated, and extricated from this philosophical context, 
which is the ostensibly goal of  Blumenberg’s project:
If  one wished to conceive and to class all the metaphorical possibilities of  
philosophy, one metaphor, at least, always would remain excluded, outside 
the system: the metaphor, at the very least, without which the concept 
of  metaphor could not be constructed […] the metaphor of  metaphor. 
(DERRIDA, 1982, p.220). 
Thus while Derrida follows Vico and Blumenberg in his acknowledgement of  
the rhetorical foundation of  philosophy, he rejects eff orts to expurgate philosophy 
of  its metaphors for reasons to which we will have an opportunity to return later in 
our discussion.
In the case of  Rorty’s neopragmatist project, the signiﬁ cance of  rhetoric is 
already evident in his important early work Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature, in 
which he seems at best ambivalent about the role of  rhetoric within the history of  
thought. In the opening pages of  this work, for instance, Rorty reduces the history 
of  Western thought to a single historical epoch that has been suff ering under the 
delusion of  metaphor: 
It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, 
which determine most of  our philosophical convictions. The picture which 
5 See Blumenberg (1997, p.98-102). See also Anselm Haverkamp (1994, 1996, 1998).
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holds traditional philosophy captive is that of  the mind as a great mirror, 
containing various representations – some accurate, some not – and capable 
of  being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of  the 
mind as mirror, the notion of  knowledge itself  as accuracy of  representation 
would not have suggested itself. Without this latter notion, the strategy 
common to Descartes and Kant – getting more accurate representations by 
inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror, so to speak – would not have 
made sense. (RORTY, 1979, p.12).
Rorty explicitly follows Hans Blumenberg here in his reduction of  the history 
of  thought and Heidegger’s history of  Being or Seinsgeschichte to a “history of  
metaphor” (RORTY, 1989, p.16)6. Yet he by no means rejects rhetoric as an obstacle 
on the road to philosophical knowledge. Instead, he is much more interested in 
abandoning the road to philosophical knowledge altogether in order to pursue the 
methodological opportunity presented by rhetoric. 
Thus, while Rorty’s interpretation of  the history of  Western thought as “[...] 
the story of  the domination of  the mind of  the West by ocular metaphors”, is 
ostensibly a rhetorical critique of  the Western philosophical tradition, it is also – 
and more signiﬁ cantly – a recognition and appreciation of  the power of  rhetoric to 
inﬂ uence the direction of  philosophical history. In other words, it is not rhetoric per 
se that constitutes the object of  his critique, but rather the aporetic metaphors that 
have held Western philosophy captive since antiquity. While he acknowledges and 
appreciates the power of  rhetoric to facilitate and consolidate broad cultural myths 
and intellectual institutions such as Western metaphysics, what Rorty objects to is the 
speciﬁ cally visual or optical nature of  the metaphors which are responsible for the 
emergence of  what he calls, following Dewey, a “spectator theory of  knowledge”7. 
Thus, rather than following the script of  the metaphorological project of  Blumenberg 
for instance which seeks to elucidate the latent operation of  metaphor within 
philosophical discourse, Rorty develops his project of  neopragmatism as a kind of  
active methodological exploitation of  metaphor, a project which seeks to create and 
circulate new metaphors in order to eff ect cultural and institutional transformation.
To be sure, such metaphors must not only be created and introduced into 
circulation, they must also be “literalized into the language” of  a given culture 
in order to achieve their intended transformative eff ects. As we have seen, Rorty 
(1991d, p.169) often speaks of  metaphors that must be “killed off ,” for instance, or 
allowed to “die off  into literalness” in order to clarify this position. As he writes in 
“The Contingency of  Language,” a metaphor introduced into circulation 
6 On Rorty’s pragmatist critique of Heidegger’s project, see Rorty (1991b).
7 On Dewey’s “spectator conception of knowledge,” see Dewey (2004, p.59-75).
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[…] will acquire a habitual use, a familiar place in the language game. It will 
thereby have ceased to be a metaphor – or, if  you like, it will have become 
what most sentences of  our language are, a dead metaphor. It will be just one 
more, literally true or literally false, sentence of  the language. That is to say, 
our theories about the linguistic behavior of  our fellows will suffi  ce to let us 
cope with its utterance in the same unthinking way in which we cope with 
most of  their other utterances. (RORTY, 1989, p.18-19). 
And although the link between Rorty’s “dead metaphors” and his goal of  social 
reform may appear unclear, the introduction and assimilation of  such metaphors 
make it possible for the pragmatist to avoid expending intellectual resources 
engaging in futile argumentation by simply changing the terms of  traditional 
philosophical debates, disposing of  long-standing philosophical aporias, and thus 
escaping false parameters of  traditional philosophy which are themselves the result 
of  prior metaphorical sedimentation. In what amounts to a kind of  homeopathic or 
homeotropic irony, the solution to the problem of  the residual metaphors that have 
become assimilated within philosophical discourse turns out to be the continued 
production of  those very metaphors.
While it is evident that Derrida and Rorty share similar perspectives on the 
rhetorical foundations of  philosophical discourse and the residual ﬁ gures, or the dead 
metaphors, that remain latent within the text of  philosophy, their views diverge quite 
dramatically on the subject of  what we might call the afterlife of  dead metaphor. As we 
have seen, Rorty’s commitment to replacing philosophy with metaphor is informed 
by his sense that changes to the language that mediates our experience of  our social 
environment can result in changes to that environment. The pragmatist pursues this 
meliorist goal by generating new metaphors, introducing them into circulation, and 
allowing them to die off  into a kind of  unconscious or mindless literality. Thus, unlike 
Nietzsche and Blumenberg who posit a model of  dead metaphor as the terminus 
a quo, or point of  departure, of  their genealogical and metaphorological projects 
respectively, Rorty reverses the trajectory of  these paradigms by positing a model of  
dead metaphor as the terminus ad quem, or goal toward which his project is underway, 
seeking to create new language that literally disappears from the consciousness of  its 
users, thus fostering a kind of  linguistic automatism among them. In his decision to 
abandon philosophy in favor of  literature, Rorty seems to have done little more than 
to rediscover the pleasures of  the Platonic cave, with the philosophia of  metaphysics 
giving way, it seems, to the philolethia of  pragmatic textualism. A good metaphor is 
not only a dead metaphor, but a forgotten metaphor.
In the case of  deconstruction, however, the situation could not be more 
diff erent. Derrida has consistently maintained and vigorously defended his view 
that the dead metaphors that litter the philosophical landscape and constitute its 
190 Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009.
discursive foundation remain very much alive, actively generating eff ects of  meaning 
and reference from beyond the grave as it were. Derrida’s position could not be more 
unequivocal in this regard. From “White Mythology” onward, he has consistently 
held that the rhetoric whose erasure conditions the emergence of  philosophical 
conceptuality remains “active and stirring”: “[…] metaphysics has erased within 
itself  the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains 
active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the 
palimpsest.” (DERRIDA, 1982, p.213). Derrida’s insistence on the life or afterlife of  
dead metaphors becomes most explicit in the debate that is played out between the 
comments made by Ricoeur in The Rule of  Metaphor on the status of  “dead metaphor” 
in Derrida’s “White Mythology” and Derrida’s response to Ricoeur in “The Retrait 
of  Metaphor”8. In the context of  this debate Derrida objects to Ricoeur’s claim 
that Derrida’s text “White Mythology” “[…] makes death or dead metaphor its 
watchword,” promoting “a concept of  metaphor dominated by the concept of  wear 
and tear as being-worn-out or becoming-worn-out.” (DERRIDA, 2007c, p.59). In question 
of  course is Derrida’s discussion of  the concept of  “usure,” the gradual erosion of  
value or meaning through continued use or circulation, at the beginning of  “White 
Mythology.” Yet far from privileging the term, Derrida subjects it to deconstructive 
analysis: 
The value of  usure also has to be subjected to interpretation. It seems to 
have a systematic tie to the metaphorical perspective. It will be rediscovered 
wherever the theme of  metaphor is privileged. And it is also a metaphor that 
implies a continuist presupposition: the history of  a metaphor appears essentially 
not as a displacement with breaks, as reinscriptions in a heterogeneous system, 
mutations, separations without origins, but rather as a progressive erosion, a 
regular semantic loss, an uninterrupted exhausting of  the primitive meaning, 
an empirical abstraction without extraction from its native soil. (DERRIDA, 
1982, p.215; 2007c, p.57).
Rather than subscribing uncritically to the idea of  metaphorical usure as Ricoeur 
suggests he does, Derrida insists that the metaphors whose original meanings have 
been eroded or worn away over time, like the surfaces of  circulating coins, are 
not simply reduced to the status of  dead metaphors but remain “alive and dead 
simultaneously”: a determination that characterizes a range of  terms along what 
Rodolphe Gasché (1986, p.185) calls deconstruction’s “infrastructural chain”: the 
trace, diff érance, supplementarity, iterability, and metaphoricity, to name only a few. 
While metaphors are subject to the gradual erosion of  their original sensory meaning 
8 For an excellent overview of this debate, see Morny Joy (1988).
191Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009.
over time, they remain subject to displacements and reinscriptions of  meaning as well. 
And they remain active or alive in the extensions, projections, and hyperbolizations 
of  ﬁ gurative meaning that are facilitated by such usure. What Derrida discerns in this 
double movement of  metaphor – always both “alive and dead,” always losing and 
gaining meaning simultaneously – is in fact a paradigm of  the process of  dialectical 
idealization itself: 
[…] the movement of  metaphorization (origin and then erasure of  the 
metaphor, transition from the proper sensory meaning to the proper spiritual 
meaning by means of  the detour of  ﬁ gures) is nothing other than a movement 
of  idealization. Which is included under the master category of  dialectical 
idealism. (DERRIDA, 1982, p.226).
What we might call Derrida’s “discontinuist” model of  the history of  metaphor, 
which is attentive to the disjunctions, displacements, ruptures and reinscriptions 
that punctuate this history, serves as a corrective to the more “continuist” view that 
metaphors simply die off  or can be killed off  into unthinking literality that informs 
the method of  Rorty’s neopragmatism. As we have seen, there is perhaps no better 
example of  this discontinuist view of  metaphor than Derridean deconstruction 
itself  which demonstrates the integral relationship between the interruption or 
occlusion of  meaning, on the one hand, and the production of  new meaning and 
reference, on the other. In A Taste for the Secret, Derrida admits that “[…] my own 
experience of  writing leads me to think that one does not always write with a desire 
to be understood – that there is a paradoxical desire not to be understood.” Absolute 
“transparency of  intelligibility,” he suggests, “would destroy the text, […] would 
show that the text has no future [avenir], that it does not overﬂ ow the present, that it 
is consumed immediately.” (DERRIDA; FERRARIS, 2001, p.30). What ensures the 
future of  his texts and thus of  deconstruction itself, one might add, is what he calls a 
perverse desire to intentionally interrupt the smooth transmission of  his own textual 
meaning as a means by which to challenge himself, his readers and his interlocutors 
to engender new contexts of  meaning: 
I have often been accused of  writing things that are unnecessarily diffi  cult, that 
could be simpliﬁ ed, and I have even been accused of  doing it on purpose. I’d 
say that this accusation is just and unjust at the same time. It is unjust because 
I really do try to be clear; it’s not that I amuse myself  multiplying obstacles 
to understanding; I can even be pedagogical – often too pedagogical, perhaps. 
But I have to admit that there is a demand in my writing for this excess even 
with respect to what I myself  can understand of  what I say – the demand that 
a sort of  opening, play, indetermination be left, signifying hospitality for what 
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is to come [l’avenir]: “One does not know what it means yet, one will have to 
start again, to return, to go on”. (DERRIDA; FERRARIS, 2001, p.31). 
We should not be surprised to hear an echo of  Rorty’s description of  the 
pragmatist who introduces unfamiliar marks, noises and vocabularies into circulation 
that call out for the creation of  new theoretical models within which they can 
be assimilated in Derrida’s description of  his tendency to leave his texts open to 
a degree of  play and indetermination that occludes immediate understanding in 
order to ensure the various futures of  deconstruction that continue to take shape 
in a range of  discursive contexts around the globe. Just as the infelicitous name 
of  deconstruction has imposed itself  and acquired meaning gradually as “a certain 
number of  actors” have worked to engender contexts of  understanding within which 
it has been assimilated, so too will the diffi  cult text of  deconstruction continue to 
impose itself  as its practitioners, interlocutors and critics work to engender new 
contexts of  understanding within which it will be assimilated in the afterlives of  its 
dead metaphors. 
REYNOLDS, A. A sobrevida das metáforas mortas: sobre o pragmatismo de 
Derrida. Revista de Letras, São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009
RESUMO ▪ : Este artigo analisa o papel da “metáfora morta” em meio à desconstrução e 
ao neopragmatismo em uma tentativa de esclarecer algumas das aﬁ nidades subreptícias 
entre as duas formações discursivas que viriam a constituir aquilo que Derrida chamou de 
“pragramatologia (a vir)”. Por meio de uma revisão metaforológica do pensamento ﬁ losóﬁ co 
que parte de Vico, passando por Nietzsche e Heidegger até Blumenberg, Derrida e Rorty, este 
artigo defende que a desconstrução continua a gerar novos contextos de sentido e de referência 
sob a forma de um pragmatismo que integra já há muito a sua identidade discursiva.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE ▪ : Desconstrução. Pragmatismo. Neopragmatismo. Retórica. 
Metáfora. Metaforologia.
References
BLUMENBERG, H. Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1998.
______. Prospect for a Theory of  Nonconceptuality. In: ______. Shipwreck with 
Spectator: Paradigm for a Metaphor of  Existence. Trans. Steven Rendall. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1997. p.81-102. 
193Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009.
______. An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Signiﬁ cance of  
Rhetoric. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. In: BAYNES, K.; BOHMAN, J.; MCCARTHY, 
T. (Ed.). After Philosophy: End or Transformation. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. 
p.429-458.
DERRIDA, J. My Chances/Mes chances: a Rendezvous with Some Epicurean 
Stereophonies. Trans. Irene Harvey and Avital Ronell. In: ______. Psyche: 
Inventions of  the Other. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007a. v.1, p.344-376.
______. Psyche: Invention of  the Other. Trans. Catherine Porter. In: ______. 
Psyche: Inventions of  the Other. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007b. v.1, 
p.1-47.
______. The Retrait of  Metaphor. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. In: ______. Psyche: 
Inventions of  the Other. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007c. v.1, p.48-80.
______. Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism. In: MOUFFE, Chantal (Ed.). 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 1996. p.77-88.
______. Afterword: Toward An Ethic of  Discussion. In: ______. Limited Inc. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988. p.111-159.
______. White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of  Philosophy. In: _____. Margins 
of  Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of  Chicago Press, 1982. 
p.207-272.
______. Of  Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976.
DERRIDA, J.; FERRARIS, M. A Taste for the Secret. Trans. Giacomo Donis. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
DEWEY, J. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Mineola: Dover, 2004.
FABBRI, L. Philosophy as Chance: An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancy. Trans. 
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. In: MITCHELL, J. T.; DAVIDSON, A. I. 
(Ed.). The Late Derrida. Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 2007. p.209-222.
GASCHÉ, R. The Tain of  the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of  Reﬂ ection. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
HAVERKAMP, A. Metaphora Dis/continua: Figure in De/construction. Mit einem 
Kommentar zur Begriff sgeschichte von Quintilian bis Baumgarten. In: HORN, E.; 
194 Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009.
WEINBERG, M. Allegorie: Konﬁ gurationen von Text, Bild und Lektüre. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998. p.29-45.
______. Metaphora Dis/continua: Base Respects of  Thrift But None of  Love. In: 
PLETT, H. F. (Ed.). Aktualität der Rhetorik. Munich: Fink Verlag, 1996. p.176-
189. 
______. Figura cryptica: Paul de Man und die Poetik nach Nietzsche. In: 
KOPPERSCHMIDT, J.; SCHANZE, H. Die Sprache ist Rhetorik. Munich: Fink 
Verlag, 1994. p.241-247. 
JOY, M. Derrida and Ricoeur: A Case of  Mistaken Identity (And Diff erence). The 
Journal of  Religion, Chicago, v.68, n.4, p.508-526, Oct. 1988. 
KOFMAN, S. Nietzsche and Metaphor. Trans. Duncan Large. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993.
MOUFFE, C. (Ed.). Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 
1996.
NIETZSCHE, F. On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense. Trans. Ronald Speirs. 
In: LEITCH, V. et al. (Ed.). The Norton Anthology of  Theory and Criticism. 
London: Norton, 2001. p.874-884.
NIETZSCHE, F. Truth and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense. Trans. Maximilian A. 
Mugge. In: ADAMS, H. (Ed.). Critical Theory since Plato. Fort Worth: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992. p.634-639.
RICOEUR, P. The Rule of  Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of  the Creation of  
Meaning in Language. Trans. Robert Czerny. Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 
1993.
RORTY, R. The Necessity of  Inspired Reading. The Chronicle of  Higher 
Education, Washington, v.42, n.22, p.A48, Feb., 1996a. 
______. Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism. In: MOUFFE, C. (Ed.). 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 1996b. p.13-18.
______. Deconstruction and Circumvention. In: ______. Essays on Heidegger 
and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991a. p.85-106.
______. Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism. In: ______. Essays on 
Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991b. p.27-49.
195Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.181-195, jul./dez. 2009.
______. Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics. In: ______. Essays on 
Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991c. p.9-26.
______. Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor. In: ______. 
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991d. p.162-174.
______. The Contingency of  Language. In: ______. Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. p.3-22.
______. Philosophy as a Kind of  Writing: An Essay on Derrida. In: ______. 
Consequences of  Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 
1982. p.90-109.
______. Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979.
VICO, G. The New Science of  Giambattista Vico. Trans. Thomas G. Bergin and 
Max H. Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948.

